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366 
Social Media Thoughtcrimes 
 
Daniel S. Harawa* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
“Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and  . . . inflict great pain.” 
-John G. Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States1 
 
The Supreme Court has “long recognized that each 
medium of expression presents special First Amendment 
problems.”2  Social media has proved this statement 
exceedingly accurate.  Social media has created a new frontier 
of constitutional issues, exacerbating the difficulty in defining 
the boundaries between free expression and criminal acts. 
Social media is a necessary part of modern interaction.  
And although Facebook, widely considered the leader of the 
social media pack,3 was created just for college students, social 
media is no longer exclusively for the youth.  As such, 73% of 
online adults use social media sites,4 56% of all Americans have 
at least one social media profile,5 and the average age of 
Facebook users is most rapidly increasing in the 45-to-54 year-
 
 * J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of 
Richmond.  I am grateful to Professor Leslie Garfield, the participants in the 
Pace Law Review Social Justice Social Media Symposium, and the Pace Law 
Review editors for their insightful comments, conversations, and feedback. 
1. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added). 
2. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citation omitted). 
3. The History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-
networking/#!OMCd2. 
4. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Social Media Update 2013, PEW RES. 
INTERNET PROJECT (Dec. 30, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/. 
5. Jay Baer, 11 Shocking New Social Media Statistics in America, 
CONVINCE & CONVERT DIGITAL MKTG. ADVISORS (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.convinceandconvert.com/social-media-research/11-shocking-new-
social-media-statistics-in-america/. 
1
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old age bracket.6  Social media has become integral to 
connecting people around the world.  But in an age where 
people are able post a steady stream of consciousness in 140 
characters or less, and can constantly take pictures in order to 
walk their followers visually through their day, broader 
implications concerning both criminal law and constitutional 
law loom.  How will the burgeoning use of social media impact 
America’s laws?  Does the Constitution protect people’s tweets, 
Facebook posts, instapics, and other online social interactions?7 
Can social media activity expose the average American to 
criminal liability? 
These questions are brought into even sharper focus when 
one considers the ways in which the government and private 
entities monitor social media sites.  Sites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, and LinkedIn make no bones 
about the fact that users who post information on these 
websites have no expectation of privacy or exclusivity in that 
information.8  And this fact, in the wake of constant Big-
Brother-like revelations of government Internet search 
capabilities,9 raises real concern as to how people use, and the 
government polices, social media.10 
The First Amendment to the Constitution trumpets 
 
6. Cooper Smith, 7 Statistics About Facebook Users that Reveal Why It’s 
Such a Powerful Marketing Platform, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2013, 8:00AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-primer-on-facebook-demographics-2013-10. 
7. See generally Brandon Griggs, When is social-media use a crime?, 
CNN TECH (Dec. 19, 2012, 5:41AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/18/tech/social-media/newtown-social-media-
crime. 
8. See, e.g., Social Networking Privacy, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (May 7, 
2014), http://epic.org/privacy/socialnet/. 
9. See, e.g., Associated Press, Everyone is Under Surveillance Now, Says 
Whistleblower Edward Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/03/everyone-is-under-
surveillance-now-says-whistleblower-edward-snowden; Editorial Board, 
Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-
blower.html?_r=0; James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions 
of Faces from Web Images, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-
web-images.html?ref=us. 
10. See Justin P. Murray & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in 
Government Investigations and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New 
Legal Issues, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2013). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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“Congress shall make no laws . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”11 While there has always been tension as to where to 
draw the line between free expression and criminal acts, in the 
age of social media this tension is unprecedented.  As such, 
there is a need to revisit the way we protect and criminalize 
online speech.12  Antiquated notions of freedom of speech and 
outmoded First Amendment doctrine do not suffice in an age 
where private thoughts and conversations are more often than 
not broadcasted in a public sphere.  Obviously, the Framers of 
the Bill of Rights did not fully anticipate the advent of the 
Internet and the social media explosion.  Moreover, in 
developing First Amendment protections, the Supreme Court 
could not adequately forecast how integral the Internet and 
social media would become to everyday life.13 
As people live out their lives online, what is protected 
expression and what is criminal speech?  This article begins to 
explore this fine distinction, and advocates for a shift in the 
way online speech is protected vis-à-vis the First Amendment.  
Part I provides examples of criminalized social media activity 
and explores why people seemingly treat online speech as 
private communications.  Part II looks at existing 
jurisprudence regarding the criminalization of speech and First 
Amendment protections.  And Part III attempts to determine 
where to draw the line by advocating for a return to simpler 
times in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
II. The Thought Police 
 
“1984 may have come a bit later than predicted, but it’s 
here at last.”14 
 
People around the world have been arrested for their social 
 
11. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
12. See, e.g., Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1 (2011). 
13. The Supreme Court did not discuss the regulation of materials 
distributed via the Internet and free speech until 1997.  See Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
14. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc.) (emphasis 
added). 
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media use.  For example, Turkish authorities arrested dozens 
of protestors for inciting anti-government sentiments over 
Twitter,15 a group of men was arrested for creating a Facebook 
page allegedly slandering President Sleiman of Lebanon, 16 a 
man in Canada was arrested for harassing someone over 
Twitter,17 and an English teen was arrested for posting 
abhorrent comments about a recently murdered girl on 
Facebook.18  In the United States, however, arresting people for 
their social media activity alone once seemed a far-fetched 
proposition.19  As a result, popular media and legal scholarly 
discourse paid closer attention to social media’s impact on 
other aspects of life, including how it has changed workplace 
harassment,20 whether student online speech can be 
regulated,21 the relatively new phenomena of cyber-bullying 
and sexting,22 and social media’s evolving role in sex crimes 
 
15. Luke Harding & Constanze Letsch, Turkish Police Arrest 25 People 
for Using Social Media to Call for Protest, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/05/turkish-police-arrests-social-
media-protest. 
16. Adrian Blomfield, Man Arrested for ‘Insulting Lebanese President on 
Facebook’, THE TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2010), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/lebanon/7914474/Ma
n-arrested-for-insulting-Lebanese-president-on-Facebook.html. 
17. Kim Magi, Man Charged with Harassment after Twitter Attacks, 
THESTAR.COM (Nov. 21, 2012), 
http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/11/21/man_charged_with_harassment
_after_twitter_attacks.html. 
18. Press Association, April Jones Murder: Teenager Jailed Over 
Offensive Facebook Posts, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/oct/08/april-jones-teenager-jailed-
facebook?newsfeed=true. 
19. See infra Part I.A. 
20. See, e.g., Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability 
Under Title VII for Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249 
(2012). 
21. Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Student Speech Online: Too Young to 
Exercise the Right to Free Speech?, 7 I/S J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 101 
(2011). 
22. See, e.g., Heather Benzmiller, Note & Comment, The Cyber-
Samaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the “Innocent” Bystanders of 
Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 927 (2013); Jamie L. Williams, Note, 
Teens, Sexts, & Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications of Current 
Sexting & Cyberbullying Laws, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1017 (2012); 
Allison V. King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the 
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845 
(2010). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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and child abuse.23 
It is time to refocus discourse on social media to 
understand how it aligns with First Amendment rights and 
basic criminal law principles as American arrests for social 
media activity are becoming increasingly commonplace.  People 
are no longer only being prosecuted for online speech that is 
inherently criminal, such as fraud or defamation,24 or social 
media activity depicting evidence of a crime that has been 
committed, such as the man who posted a picture of his dead 
wife on Facebook.25  Americans are being placed in the criminal 
justice system for posting thoughts that express criminal ideas 
— words that foreshadow a criminal event with no other action 
in furtherance of the crime — what I call social media 
thoughtcrime.26  Criminalizing thoughts, even when posted 
online, pose serious problems given that speech should be by 
default protected by the First Amendment, subject to 
(supposedly) narrow exceptions. 
The Orwellian tenor may seem hyperbolic, but one just 
 
23. See, e.g., Eva Conner, Comment, Why Don’t You Take a Seat Away 
from That Computer?: Why Louisiana Revised State 14:91.5 Is 
Unconstitutional, 73 LA. L. REV. 883 (2013). 
24. See Garfield, supra note 12. 
25. See Snejana Farberov, Man Who Shot Dead His Wife Then Posted 
‘RIP’ Picture of Her Corpse on Facebook Page Played a Gun-Toting Gang 
Member in TV Series and Has Dreams of Fame, DAILYMAIL.COM (Aug. 6, 
2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2387305/Derek-Medina-
Florida-man-posts-picture-dead-wife-Jennifer-Alfonso-Facebook.html. 
26. This phrase was used by George Orwell in his famous novel on 
dystopian society, 1984.  To explore this question, it is important to underline 
what is not being explored.  This article does not explore the many issues 
that arise as a result of government social media monitoring.  See, e.g., April 
Warren, Law Enforcement Increasingly Turning to Social Media, OCALA STAR 
BANNER, May 30, 2013, 
http://www.ocala.com/article/20130530/ARTICLES/130539959.  Likewise, it 
does not address private monitoring and social media sites turning over 
users’ information to assist with government investigations.  See, e.g., 
Mallory Allen & Aaron Orheim, Get Outta My Face[book]: The Discoverability 
of Social Networking Data and the Passwords Needed to Access Them, 8 
WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 137 (2012).  Nor does it focus on the use of social 
media in criminal prosecutions.  See, e.g., Ken Strutin, Social Media and 
Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 
228 (2011).  Finally, it takes no position on the criminalization of direct 
threats sent over social media platforms.  These are all important issues 
implicated by the question explored herein that are worthy of further 
discussion, but largely outside the scope of this article. 
5
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need turn on the news to see this very issue played out in real 
time.  Tweeters and Facebook users have been arrested for 
sharing their thoughts, ideas, and crude senses of humor.  
What once seemed a fantastical parade of horribles is now a 
reality; this past year alone has demonstrated that Americans 
can, and are arrested for their social media activity. 
 
A.  Kids Being Kids? 
 
1. Justin Carter 
 
Perhaps the most famous story of a social media inspired 
arrest is the story of Justin Carter.  During an online exchange 
while playing the game League of Legends, then-eighteen-year-
old Justin Carter posted on Facebook an allegedly sarcastic 
comment about how he was going to “shoot up a 
kindergarten.”27  Justin made the comment at an extremely 
sensitive time — two months after the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School shooting.28  Another Facebook user saw the comment 
and reported it to authorities.29  Justin was arrested and 
charged with the felony of making a terrorist threat.30 Justin’s 
case has received widespread media attention and generated 
public outcry, with over 100,000 people petitioning for his 
release.31 Justin’s case got so much attention that an 
anonymous donor posted his $500,000 bond.32  Justin is 
currently awaiting trial, and is facing up to eight years in 
prison.33 
 
27. Brandon Griggs, Teen jailed for Facebook ‘joke’ is Released, CNN 
(July 13, 2013, 8:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/12/tech/social-
media/facebook-jailed-teen/. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Suzanne Choney, Petition to Free Jailed Facebook Teen Reaches 
100,000 Signatures, TODAY (July 9, 2013, 7:11PM), 
http://www.today.com/money/petition-free-jailed-facebook-teen-reaches-100-
000-signatures-6C10584678. 
32. Id. 
33. Andrew Delgado & Rogello Mares, Trial Continues for New 
Braunfels Teen Accused of Making Facebook Threats, KENS5.COM (Mar. 27, 
2014), http://www.kens5.com/videos/news/local/2014/06/27/10675082/. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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While Justin’s story garnered the most public attention, he 
is not the only person recently arrested for their social media 
activities. 
 
 
2. Chicago Teenager 
 
A fifteen-year-old teenager was arrested in Chicago and 
charged with a felony for tweeting he would commit “mass 
homicide” if George Zimmerman was found not guilty in the 
killing of Trayvon Martin.34 Although the police recognized the 
teen did not possess any weapons nor did he pose a credible 
threat, police still charged him with felony disorderly conduct.35 
 
3. Cameron D’Ambrosio 
 
Cameron D’Ambrosio, a Massachusetts high school 
student, was arrested and charged with communicating 
terroristic threats for posting this rap lyric on Facebook: “fuck 
a boston bombinb [sic] wait till u see the shit I do, I’ma be 
famous rapping, and beat every murder charge that comes 
across me!”36 The teen got off lightly, however, when the grand 
jury refused to indict him, requiring his release.37 
 
4. Leigh Van Bryan & Emily Bunting 
 
Two British tourists were arrested and detained for over 
twelve hours at the Los Angeles airport for their Twitter 
 
34. Nicholas Demas, 8 Social Media Users Arrested for What They Said 
Online, POLICY MIC (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/54961/8-social-media-users-arrested-for-
what-they-said-online. 
35. Hunter Stuart, Teen Charged With Felony After Threatening ‘Mass 
Homicide’ If Zimmerman Acquitted, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2013, 10:34 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/15/mass-homicide-
zimmerman_n_3599238.html. 
36. John Knefel, Grand Jury Rejects Indictment of Teen Arrested for Rap 
Lyrics, ROLLING STONE (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/grand-jury-rejects-indictment-of-
teen-arrested-for-rap-lyrics-20130606. 
37. Id. 
7
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activity.38  Leigh Van Bryan was arrested for tweeting “Free 
this week, for quick gossip/prep before I go and destroy 
America?”39  Little did Department of Homeland Security know 
that “destroy” is British slang for party.40  Homeland Security 
also detained and questioned Leigh’s companion Emily 
Bunting, in part for her quoting popular American sitcom 
Family Guy, tweeting, “3 weeks today, we’re totally in LA 
[pissing] people off on Hollywood Blvd and diggin’ Marilyn 
Monroe up!”41 
 
5. “Sarah,” the Dutch Teenager 
 
Most recently, a Dutch teenager identified as “Sarah,” 
tweeted to American Airlines: “@AmericanAir hello my name’s 
Ibrahim and I’m from Afghanistan.  I’m a part of Al Qaida and 
on June 1st I’m gonna do something really big bye[.]”42  
American Airlines responded, telling Sarah, “we take these 
threats very seriously.  Your IP address and details will be 
forwarded to security and the FBI.”43  Sarah then attempted to 
double-back on her original tweet, saying that she was “stupid” 
and “scared,” at one point saying her friend was responsible for 
the tweet.44  The recantations were not enough, however, as 
Sarah later turned herself over to the Rotterdam police for 
questioning.45 
The unexpected twist to Sarah’s story is that in an 
 
38. Richard Hartley-Parkinson, ‘I’m Going to Destroy American Dig Up 
Marilyn Monroe’: British Pair Arrested in U.S. on Terror Charges Over 
Twitter Jokes, DAILYMAIL.COM (Jan. 31, 2012, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093796/Emily-Bunting-Leigh-Van-
Bryan-UK-tourists-arrested-destroy-America-Twitter-jokes. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Salma Abdelaziz, Teen Arrested for Tweeting Airline Terror Threat, 
CNN (Apr. 14, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/14/travel/dutch-
teen-arrest-american-airlines-terror-threat-tweet/. 
43. Id. 
44. Ben Mutzabaugh, Teen Girl Who Sent Terroristic Tweet To AA is 
Arrested, USA TODAY (Apr. 15, 2014, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/2014/04/14/girl-sends-
terroristic-tweet-to-aa-gets-unwanted-response/7694161/. 
45. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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apparent show of solidarity, dozens of teenagers tweeted bomb 
“jokes” to American airlines, despite the risk of arrest.46  The 
reactions to Sarah’s arrest highlighted the fact that despite the 
increasing number social media-based arrests, either many still 
do not understand the potential gravitas of their online 
activity, or they are willing to risk arrest in an effort to protect 
their freedom of speech online. 
In the above stories, is the social media activity 
insensitive?  Yes.  Crude?  Most definitely.  But criminal?  This 
article proposes a framework for this much-needed debate.  
Although technically a public forum, social media sites have 
become a place of primary communication for many Americans.  
People, especially youth, feel comfortable sharing private 
thoughts online because they are sharing them with their 
“friends,” not necessarily the world at large.47  Society’s 
expectation of privacy in its social media activity is important 
to consider when deciding when to criminalize social media 
thoughtcrimes. 
These examples are important to keep in mind as such 
cases are litigated and First Amendment parameters around 
social media activity are defined.  As it is the criminalization of 
this form of speech — asinine, insensitive, tasteless, and often-
juvenile social media activity, designed to be shared with 
friends but is available to the world—that is relevant to this 
article. 
 
B. Why (Young) People Consider Public Speech Private 
 
The relationship between Americans and social media is 
 
46. Caitlin Dewey, Dozens of Teenagers Are Now Tweeting Bomb Jokes to 
American Airlines, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2014/04/14/dozens-of-
teenagers-are-now-tweeting-bomb-jokes-to-american-airlines/. 
47. See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says 
Facebook Founder, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:58 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy. This 
phenomenon has extended beyond thoughts, as a “sexting” culture has 
emerged, where people are now sharing intimate pictures of themselves 
through various online platforms. Gwen O’Keeffee & Kathleen Clarke-
Pearson, The Impact of Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and Families, 
127 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 800 (2011), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/127/4/800.full.html. 
9
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complicated.  “In America, we live in a paradoxical world of 
privacy.  On one hand, teenagers reveal their intimate 
thoughts and behaviors online and, on the other hand, 
government agencies and marketers are collecting personal 
data about us.”48  However, it is not happenstance that people 
are beginning to share the most intimate aspects of their lives, 
including their thoughts, online.  Social scientists have started 
to develop the social psychology behind the way in which 
people, especially young people, use social media, which should 
be considered when deciding how to define the constitutional 
boundaries around social media activity. 
In many ways, social media has become part of human 
identity.  It provides a forum for people to shape their perfect 
self — allowing them to portray to the world who they want it 
to see.49  A person’s behavior on social media is not necessarily 
an accurate reflection of self, but instead is an aggrandizement 
based on who that person wants to be, or who she or he 
believes those viewing the profile will find most attractive or 
appealing.50  And while a person’s social media footprint may 
not be an accurate reflection of who that person is, it is 
becoming a necessary tool for identity formation.  It is well 
documented that an active social media presence is often seen 
as necessary to engage with and belong to broader society;51 it 
is important for the creation and maintenance of social 
capital.52  For many, this public activity is a critical vehicle of 
self-expression.  It is important to remember when considering 
whether it is permissible to criminalize social media activity, 
that a person’s social media behavior is often an online 
caricature. 
 
48. Susan B. Barnes, A Privacy Paradox: Social Networking in the 
United States, 11 FIRST MONDAY 9 (Sept. 4, 2006), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1394/1312. 
49. See, e.g., id. (“[T]eenagers sometimes fabricate information to post on 
these sites. Increasingly, many teenagers feel pressured to show themselves 
doing more risqué things, even if they are not actually doing them” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
50. Id. 
51. Nicole B. Ellison, et al., Negotiating Privacy Concerns and Social 
Capital Needs in a Social Media Environment, in PRIVACY ONLINE 19, 21 
(Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011). 
52. Id. at 24. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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Social media is also increasingly important for identity 
development.  As one author put it, it is a safe place to conduct 
adolescence.53 Millennials have substituted in-person 
interaction with online communication, using the Internet as a 
primary vehicle for communication.54  While adolescences and 
teenagers previously made the mistakes of youth in private, 
today, they often occur in a forum that someone is actively 
monitoring.55  And replicating the natural maturation process, 
there is evidence that young people do not make the same 
misjudgments throughout their online lives; as people mature, 
their social media habits evolve with them.56  Thus, the virtual 
aspects of adolescence and its attendant misjudgments and 
mistakes are necessary to consider when viewing social media 
activity in the criminal context. 
Finally, it is important to remember how people are using 
social media at the most fundamental level.  In an increasingly 
globalized world, social media is integral to maintaining 
relationships.57  Data suggests that a majority of people do not 
use social media to interact with strangers, but instead, to stay 
connected with people with whom a relationship had been 
developed offline.58  Moreover, most do not use social media 
networks haphazardly.  People consciously consider who sees 
what aspect of their online persona — carefully maintaining 
privacy settings and deciding what information to share with 
whom.59  That many people use social media to interact with 
 
53. Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content 
Creation: Teenagers’ Use of Social Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy and 
Self-Expression, 10 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 393, 396 (2008). 
54. See id. at 404; see also Barnes, supra note 48. 
55. See Barnes, supra note 48. 
56. See generally Janna Q. Anderson & Lee Rainie, Millennials Will 
Make Online Sharing in Networks a Lifelong Habit, PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT, at 8-11 (2010), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media/Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Future_Of_Millennials.pdf. 
57. See Patricia Reaney, Email Connects 85 Percent of the World; Social 
Media Connects 62 Percent, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/email-connects-the-
world_n_1381854.html. 
58. See Nicole Ellison, Charles Steinfield, & Cliff Lampe, The Benefits of 
Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social 
Network Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC’N 1143, 1153-55 (2007). 
59. See Mary Madden, Privacy Management on Social Media Sites, PEW 
11
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real-life friends (as opposed to virtual friends), and think that 
they have a modicum of control over the privacy of their 
postings, helps explain why people share private thoughts 
online, despite the fact that they are technically available to 
the world at large.60 
Though the stories of social media thoughtcrimes above 
may seem ludicrous in isolation, in context, it is not without 
reason why people share private thoughts online.61  And 
although one can cast these examples off as extreme incidents 
of government overreach or isolated examples of social media 
misuse, where eventually the prosecution will be dropped or 
the jury will nullify, it is not clear that social media’s current 
trajectory will prove this the case.  As social media becomes 
ubiquitous, monitoring capabilities advance, and the fear of 
terrorism intensifies, social media thoughtcrime arrests will 
almost certainly continue to multiply in number.  Therefore, 
the general context of social media use, and its modern day 
explosion is important to keep in mind when considering the 
First Amendment protections of social media activity, 
recognizing that prior First Amendment doctrines and 
antiquated notions of private versus public fora may not neatly 
fit the online arena. 
 
III.  Protection of Speech, or Lack Thereof 
 
“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”62 
 
 
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, at 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-
media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Privacy_management_on_social_media_sites_
022412.pdf. 
60. See Barnes, supra note 48. 
61. In a study performed by Pew Research Center, only 9% of teen social 
media users expressed high-level concern of third-party access to their data. 
Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER, at 10 (May 21, 2013), available at 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Teens-Social-Media-And-Privacy.aspx. 
62. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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While the First Amendment declares that Congress, and 
by incorporation the states, shall make no laws abridging the 
freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has made clear that free 
speech protections are not absolute.63  What is also clear, at 
least in theory, is that “[t]he First Amendment protects a wide 
array of distasteful, disturbing, defamatory or factually false, 
profane, ‘anti-American,’ and hateful speech.”64 
States and the federal government tend to criminalize 
speech intended to cause direct and imminent injury, which 
courts often hold to be a permissible restriction on free 
speech.65  Yet when it comes to proscribing unpopular speech, 
the Supreme Court has tended to view such restraints with 
intense skepticism, intimating that crass speech deserves just 
as much protection, if not more, than other types of 
expression.66  To test First Amendment boundaries, the 
Supreme Court first looks at whether an activity constitutes 
“speech;”67 and if it does, the Court then decides whether it 
falls outside of constitutional protections.68 
 
A. Online Activity Is Speech 
 
For the purpose of social media postings, two categories of 
 
63. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1986); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479-88 (1957). 
64. S. Cagle Juhan, Note, Free Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile 
Speech Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1578 (2012).  A recent case bears 
this out.  In United States v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor 
Act, which criminalized false statements concerning awards of military 
honors. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).  Although the Justices could not reach a 
consensus as to why the Stolen Valor Act violated the First Amendment – 
four justices felt that falsity by itself is insufficient to justify criminal 
prosecution, id. at 2547-48, while two Justices felt the objectives of the Stolen 
Valor Act could have been achieved in a less-restrictive way.  Id. at 2551 
(Breyer, J., concurring). The fact remained that free speech triumphed and 
lies were protected.  For a discussion on Alvarez, see Rodney A. Smolla, 
Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Rolling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and 
Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 499 (2012). 
65. Susan Brenner, Criminalizing “Problematic” Speech Online, 11 J. 
INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2007). 
66. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992). 
67. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
68. See, e.g., id. at 406-08. 
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speech are especially relevant.  First, there is “pure speech,” 
which consists of communicative thoughts or words that are 
verbalized and/or written.69 This category of speech would 
seemingly encompass Facebook statuses, tweets, and other 
means by which users express their thoughts through writing, 
because the Supreme Court made clear that acts “disclosing” or 
“publishing” information constitutes “pure speech.”70  And in 
case there was any doubt whether online activity is speech 
protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
clearly held that online speech deserves the complete 
protections of the First Amendment.71  Thus, although when 
the Court first used the term “pure speech” it may not have 
envisioned social media activity, such as tweeting, as conveying 
“pure speech,” it ostensibly falls within the First Amendment 
definition and is therefore deserving of the highest level of 
constitutional protection.72 
Then there is symbolic expression, which is also “speech” 
for First Amendment purposes, and therefore privy to its 
protections.  To determine whether symbolic expression falls 
under the First Amendment definition of “speech,” the 
Supreme Court uses a two-part test, asking whether (1) there 
is intent to convey a particularized message; and (2) there is a 
great likelihood that those encountering the message would 
understand it.73  First Amendment communicative expression 
would appear to cover some instances of online picture 
posting,74 sharing certain content or webpages,75 retweeting, 
reposting other people’s thoughts, or even “liking” a Facebook 
page or status.76  Thus, the First Amendment should protect, in 
 
69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1529 (9th ed. 2009). 
70. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 (2001). 
71. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
72. For a more detailed discussion of the various approaches courts take 
to delimiting online speech, see Steven M. Puiszis, "Tinkering" With the First 
Amendment's Protection of Student Speech on the Internet, 29 J. MARSHALL J. 
OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 167, 197-202 (2011). 
73. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam). 
74. See Puiszis, supra note 72, at 197. 
75. Id. 
76. See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384-87 (4th Cir. 2013); Ira P. 
Robbins, What is the Meaning of “Like”: The First Amendment Implications of 
Social Media Expression, 7 FED. CT. L. REV. 127, 145 (2013).  There is also an 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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theory, a wide array of social media activity unless it falls into 
one of the limited predefined exceptions previously laid out by 
the Supreme Court. 
 
B. Current Exceptions to First Amendment Free Speech 
Protections 
 
Just because some social media usage falls within the First 
Amendment definition of “speech” does not automatically 
guarantee all social media activity has constitutional 
protection.  The Supreme Court has carved out certain types of 
speech that do not fall within the ambit of First Amendment 
safeguards.  Categories of unprotected speech include: advocacy 
intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action;77 
obscenity;78 defamation;79 child pornography;80 “fighting 
words”;81 fraud;82 true threats;83 speech integral to criminal 
conduct;84 and speech presenting a grave and imminent threat 
the government has the power to prevent.85  In the eyes of the 
Supreme Court, this speech is undeserving of First 
Amendment protections because “such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by social interest in 
order and morality.”86 
The examples of social media speech in Part I clearly do 
not fit into most of the defined First Amendment exceptions.  
Many of the categories, such as fraud and defamation, focus on 
 
argument to be made that such expression constitutes pure speech under the 
First Amendment.  See id. at 144. 
77. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
78. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
79. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
80. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
82. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
83. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
84. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
85. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); 
Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
86. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572. 
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direct harm to an individual, which most would agree the 
government has the power to proscribe.  Other categories 
center on expression that is so distasteful (an amorphous 
standard), such as obscenity and pornography, that the activity 
does not have the value of “speech” protected by the First 
Amendment.  No one would argue that the examples of social 
media thoughtcrime contained herein fall outside of the First 
Amendment’s grace because of these exceptions. 
However, two categories of First Amendment exceptions 
are especially salient for the purposes of the conversation: 
imminent lawlessness and true threats, which are criminalized 
based on public harm and criminal advocacy.  However, while 
in the abstract it may make sense to except threats and 
criminal advocacy from First Amendment protections much in 
the same way that inherently criminal speech is excepted, in 
practice, as shown below, defining these exceptions has been 
much harder to accomplish. 
 
1. Imminent Lawlessness 
 
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court struck new 
ground by advancing the imminent lawlessness exception to 
First Amendment speech protections.87  In Brandenburg, the 
Court found that the First Amendment protects speech-
advocating violence at a Ku Klux Klan rally.88  The Klan 
members advocated returning the “nigger . . . to Africa, [and] 
the Jew . . . to Israel[;]” and declared that “revengeance” may 
be needed if the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President 
continue to suppress “the white, Caucasian race.”89  Authorities 
arrested the Klan members for violating Ohio’s criminal 
syndicalism statute.90  The Court reversed, finding that the 
First Amendment protected the Klan’s openly hostile speech, 
and that the Ohio syndicalism statute is unconstitutional 
because it punished “mere advocacy.”91  The Court explained, 
“constitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do not permit a 
 
87. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
88. Id. at 446, 448-49. 
89. Id. at 447. 
90. Id. at 444-45. 
91. Id. at 448-49. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action.”92  The Court drew a distinction between 
advocating illegal acts versus “steeling” a group for violent 
behavior.93 
Recognizing that the concept of “imminence” is inherently 
ambiguous, the Court attempted to clarify the imminent 
lawlessness exception in Hess v. Indiana.94  Here, a student 
protester faced arrest for statements made at a university 
rally, where the sheriff overheard the protester saying, “We’ll 
take the fucking street later” (or something to that effect).95  
The sheriff arrested the student for disorderly conduct, which 
the student challenged on First Amendment grounds.  The 
State of Indiana defended the arrest by arguing the speech 
incited imminent lawless action, and therefore was not 
protected by the First Amendment.96  The Court disagreed, 
clarifying that unless there is “evidence, or rational inference 
from the import of the language, that his words were intended 
to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those 
words could not be punished by the State on the ground that 
they had a tendency to lead to violence.”97  Hess leaves open the 
natural follow-up question of how imminent is imminent.98 
 
2. True Threats 
 
The Supreme Court first articulated the true threats 
doctrine in the 1969 case Watts v. United States.99  In Watts, a 
young African-American man was protesting the draft by 
participating in a public rally, and said: “They always holler at 
 
92. Id. at 447 (footnote omitted). 
93. Id. at 448. 
94. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
95. Id. at 107. 
96. Id. at 109. 
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98. It has not gone unnoticed how difficult it is to define “imminence,” 
and how this difficultly is exacerbated in a time of terror.  See, e.g., Robert S. 
Tanenbaum, Preach Terror: Free Speech of Wartime Incitement, 55 AM. U. L. 
REV. 785, 805 (2006). 
99. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
17
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us to get an education.  And now I have already received my 
draft classification  . . . I am not going.  If they ever make me 
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J.”100  As a result of this public outcry, Watts was arrested 
and charged with making criminal threats against the 
President.101  Watts challenged his arrest, arguing he did not 
intend to harm the President, stressing the context of the 
speech and the fact that he made the statement in the course of 
a political debate.102 
The Court sided with Watts.  Calling his speech “political 
hyperbole,” the Court held that Watts’s speech did not 
constitute a “true threat” removing it from First Amendment 
protections, because: one, the comments were made 
accompanying a political debate; two, the threats were 
conditional in nature; and three, when putting the speech into 
context, the listening audience did not perceive Watts’ words to 
be threatening — in fact, many listeners laughed at Watts’ 
remarks.103  Context was essential to the Court when deciding 
whether speech is a “true threat” allowing the government to 
criminalize it.  Still, although the Court found that Watts’ 
speech was not a true threat excepting it from the First 
Amendment, the Court did little to explain what would be a 
true threat, instead framing its holding in the negative. 
In Virginia v. Black, a plurality of the Court attempted to 
clarify the definition of a “true threat.”104  Writing for four 
justices, Justice O’Connor explained that a true threat simply 
requires a speaker to convey a threatening message to a wider 
audience.105  To her, it did not matter whether the speaker 
actually intended “to carry out the threat.  Rather, a 
prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear 
of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in 
addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.’”106  Under this broad 
 
100. Id. at 706. 
101. Id. at 705-06. 
102. Id. at 707. 
103. Id. at 708. 
104. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003). 
105. Id. at 359-60. 
106. Id. at 360 (citations omitted). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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articulation of the true threat doctrine, it is arguable that the 
broadcasting of a threatening message is enough to except the 
message from First Amendment protections, regardless of the 
intent of the speaker or the effect on the audience. 
 
C. The Difficulty of Applying Present First Amendment 
Exceptions to Social Media Thoughtcrime 
 
It is relatively clear that the social media thoughtcrimes 
described in Part I do not fall under most of the exceptions to 
the First Amendment.107  It is murky, however, as to whether 
the online activity is excepted from the First Amendment 
under the true threats or imminent lawlessness doctrines, and 
the answer will often turn on the identity of the decision-
maker.  It is for these reasons that neither test provides an 
adequate measure by which to judge whether the First 
Amendment protects social media activity. 
 
1. Brandenburg Does Not Work 
 
While most view Brandenburg as a ringing endorsement of 
free speech rights, it has left open more questions than it has 
answered.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has done little to 
resolve the questions left in the wake of Brandenburg,108 the 
most glaring of which, is how to define imminence.  While the 
Court said in a future case, that if the unlawful activity 
advocated is weeks or months down the road, it will likely not 
be considered imminent, short of that, there are no clear 
parameters.109  What is imminent, therefore, necessarily relies 
on the discretion of the factfinder.  And while most legal tests 
rely on discretion to some degree, there needs to be clearer 
guidelines when considering First Amendment rights in the 
context of social media activity, as the everyday activities of the 
vast majority of Americans are implicated. 
The ambiguity of imminence is not the only fault of 
 
107. See supra Part II.B for a list of exceptions to the First Amendment. 
108. See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 655, 667-70 (2009). 
109. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982). 
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Brandenburg, however.  There is a question if the Brandenburg 
test is limited to speech that is “political advocacy,” or if it 
applies to all speech.  If Brandenburg is limited to political 
advocacy, some social media thoughtcrimes may be judged 
under the test and some might not.  This also begs the 
question, what exactly is political advocacy?  Does 
Brandenburg only apply to speech that encourages others to 
commit criminal acts in a show of political protest, or does it 
apply when the individual speaker discusses their own 
criminal proclivities in a political context or in relation to a 
political event?110  Regardless, applying two separate tests to 
generally similar conduct can lead to strange results, which is 
unhelpful when free speech rights in the online context need to 
be clearly defined. 
There is also a question as to whether Brandenburg 
applies to private acts, or if it is solely limited to public 
speech.111  Some argue that speech must be communicated in a 
public setting for Brandenburg to apply.112  The question of 
whether Brandenburg is limited to public speech becomes even 
further complicated when asked in the social media context, as 
some social media users often think their activity is private, 
when technically most activity is public in some sense.  
Therefore, should the amount of protection social media 
activities receive turn on a user’s privacy setting?  Is online 
speech truly private given the level of monitoring that occurs 
by both public and private actors?  These gray areas leave in 
limbo quasi-private online acts and do not clearly explain how 
Brandenburg applies to social media activity. 
While Brandenburg was a useful step in the evolution of 
freedom of speech, as it stands now, the imminent lawlessness 
test applied in Brandenburg is hard to apply in the social 
media context and may produce varying results.  Because the 
import and reach of Brandenburg is largely unsettled as it 
 
110. See Healy, supra note 108, at 681. 
111. Id.; see also Tenenbaum, supra note 98, at 817-18 (citing Herceg v. 
Hustler Mag., 814 F.2d 1017, 2020-23 (5th Cir. 1987), where the court 
implied that the state interest in regulating private speech is much less than 
the state interest in regulating public speech). 
112. See, e.g., O. Lee Reed, The State Is Strong but I Am Weak: Why the 
“Imminent Lawless Action” Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted Speech 
That Threatens Individuals with Violence, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 177 (2000). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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presently stands, it is an ineffective means to regulate online 
speech and test its validity under the First Amendment. 
 
2. The True Threats Doctrine Is Unwieldy 
 
The Supreme Court has never given an adequate definition 
of what constitutes a true threat, and its one attempt to 
provide clarity further obfuscated the issue.  As such, there is a 
fracas in the lower courts applying the true threats doctrine, 
with all forms of tests emerging when applying the amorphous 
First Amendment exception.113  The uncertainty shrouding the 
true threats doctrine is evidenced by the fact that there is even 
a question if the true threats doctrine is a standalone test, or 
merely a refinement or subpart of the test announced in 
Brandenburg. 114 
Courts are divided as to whether there needs to be 
identifiable targets of the threats, or if a general threat is 
enough to except speech from the First Amendment.115  Some 
courts have interpreted Justice O’Connor’s definition of true 
threats to subsume every threat made in public, regardless of 
the intent of the speaker.116  Others believe the true threats 
definition used in Black requires intent on the part of the 
speaker — that the speaker must have intended to carry out 
the threat that she or he publically conveyed; yet whether this 
is a subjective or objective standard of intent divides the 
courts.117  Again, the ambiguities raise challenging questions in 
the social media context, and may yield different results 
depending on the arbiter.118 
 
113. See Paul T. Crane, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1225, 1265-69 (2006); Steven G. Gey, Cross Burning, Intimidation, and 
Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1326-27, 1331-33 (2005). 
114. See Gey, supra note 113, at 1331. 
115. Id. at 1332-33. 
116. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616-17 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
117. Crane, supra note 113, at 1261-69 (discussing various cases 
applying subjective or objective intent requirements). 
118. The Supreme Court has recently heard argument on the application 
of the true threats doctrine to the social media context.  See Elonis v. United 
States, No. 13-983 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2014). The case involves threats the 
petitioner made against his wife over Facebook - he was arrested for violating 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012), which prohibits the transmission of threats in 
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Some scholars have suggested that Black’s true threats 
doctrine is inapplicable to private speech.119  Their reasoning is 
that privately communicated threats receive little or no 
protection under the First Amendment, and that the true 
threats inquiry is therefore irrelevant to threats made in 
private.120  However, this raises questions as to how to define 
publically-communicated threats versus privately-
communicated threats.  Should it depend on the number of 
views a post receives, whether only a social media user’s 
“friends” can view the threat, or does it depend on how many 
“friends” a social media user has?  Alternatively, are social 
media posts punishable when the public at large can view 
them?  If someone intended to convey a private threat online, is 
it no longer private because of the inherent lack of privacy on 
social media networks? 
Applying the concept of a “true threat” to the online sphere 
is like trying to fit a round peg in a square hole.  Very little of 
what is conveyed online is accurate, and much online speech is 
flat-out false, even when people are portending to portray their 
personal life.  The concept of “truth” is fleeting online, and 
therefore, the true threats doctrine is dangerous to apply given 
the context. 
Like Brandenburg, there are too many questions presently 
left open by Black for the true threats doctrine to be useful in 
defining whether social media activity should be protected or 
not.  As explained in the next section, it is time to move away 
from the current First Amendment exceptions when deciding 
whether social media activity is punishable.  There should be 
one question based on established Supreme Court precedent 
that authorities and courts should ask when deciding whether 
the First Amendment protects social media speech: Does the 
social media activity create a clear and present danger?  If not, 
the First Amendment protects it. 
 
IV. Protecting Online Speech - A Return to Simpler Times 
 
 
interstate commerce.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013). 
119. Gey, supra note 113, at 1350. 
120. See Reed, supra note 112, at 206-07. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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It is important to define the line between online speech 
and criminal activity as social media becomes an indispensable 
part of basic human expression; “What is a threat must be 
distinguished from what is constitutionally protected.”121  Most 
would agree that arrest and prosecution for social media 
thoughtcrimes is a waste of scarce resources, unnecessarily 
involving young people in the criminal justice system.122  
Conversely, many would argue that we should not tie the 
hands of law enforcement, and that policing online activity is a 
valid method of ferreting out nefarious actors.123  Given this 
tension, when attempting to understand how social media 
should be used vis-à-vis the criminal justice system, law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and the public need a simple 
directive to guide the criminalization of online speech.  Luckily, 
the Supreme Court, through First Amendment maverick 
Justice Holmes, announced a First Amendment test, the clear 
and present danger test, that with some refinement may 
provide the necessary answer to the First Amendment online 
speech conundrum. 
 
A. The Development of Clear and Present Danger 
 
The Supreme Court was at best apathetic and at worst 
openly hostile to the idea of free speech up until the early 
1900s.  Then, with Justice Brandeis at his side, Justice Holmes 
began to forge a new path in First Amendment jurisprudence, 
 
121. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
122. If nothing but anecdotal evidence, the public reactions to the stories 
outlined in Part I, including the petition for Justin Carter, and the grand 
jury’s failure to indict Cameron D’Ambrosio, show that the public in some 
regard does not think that this form of speech should be criminally 
sanctioned. 
123. For example, Boston Marathon bombing suspect Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev allegedly posted a number of radical jihadist videos on YouTube, 
leaving people to wonder why his social media activity did not raise red flags 
and prompt further investigation.  See David W. Kearn, The Boston 
Marathon Bombing One Year Later: What We Still Don’t Know, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 25, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-w-
kearn/the-boston-marathon-bombi_2_b_5213398.html; Tim Lister & Paul 
Cruickshank, Dead Boston bomb suspect posted video of jihadist, analysis 
shows, CNN (Apr. 22, 2013, 11:13 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/20/us/brother-religious-language/. 
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with many crediting the duo for the free speech protections we 
have today.124  In a 1919 trio of cases, Justice Holmes wrote 
three First Amendment opinions for a unanimous Court.125  
Although the Court decided all three cases against the person 
claiming free speech protections, one case in particular stands 
out for its rhetorical endorsement of the First Amendment. 
In Schenck v. United States, Charles Schenck, a popular 
socialist, was arrested for distributing flyers to American 
service members that asserted the draft was the equivalent of 
involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.126  For his actions, authorities charged Schenck 
with violating the Espionage Act, as he was conspiring “to 
cause insubordination.”127  Before the Supreme Court, Schenck 
argued his arrest violated his First Amendment rights, but the 
Court, through Justice Holmes, affirmed his conviction.128  In 
finding that the arrest and conviction did not infringe upon 
Schenck’s First Amendment rights, Holmes first used the 
language of clear and present danger, saying: 
 
The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a 
question of proximity and degree.129 
 
Holmes provided a pragmatic test relying on imminence and 
context, because “the character of every act depends upon the 
 
124. It has been hypothesized that Justice Holmes’ clear and present 
danger standard was inspired in part by his relationship with Judge Learned 
Hand, who had announced a similar incitement test for advocacy of criminal 
activity. Masses Pub. Co v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  See Thomas 
Healy, The Justice Who Changed His Mind: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and 
the Story Behind Abrams v. United States, 39 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 35, 70 
(2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384855. 
125. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Deb v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 
(1919). 
126. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 50-51. 
127. Id. at 48-49. 
128. Id. at 52-53. 
129. Id. at 52. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
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circumstances in which it is done.”130 
Funnily, Holmes did not mention the clear and present 
danger test in the other two cases unanimously decided that 
term.  Instead, he summarily affirmed the convictions in the 
face of First Amendment challenges, leading some to wonder 
whether the seemingly righteous endorsement of speech used 
in Schenck was accidental drafting or incidental lip service.131  
In practice, Holmes and the Court seemed to side effortlessly 
with the government’s attempts to criminalize speech. 
Then, Holmes disabused any notion that he was not a free 
speech champion with his dissent later that year in Abrams v. 
United States.132  The facts of Abrams were not all that 
dissimilar from Schenck; the Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction of a man charged under the Espionage Act for 
distributing pamphlets with anti-war sentiments.133  However, 
writing for himself and Justice Brandeis, Justice Holmes 
dissented.  Reviving the clear and present danger test, Justice 
Holmes found the behavior here was protected by the First 
Amendment.134  He clarified that the clear and present danger 
test relies on criminal common law principles of attempt, in 
that for criminal advocacy to fall outside of the reach of the 
First Amendment, the speaker must intend to commit or have 
result the crime advocated, and take some act in furtherance of 
that intent.135  As such, he notes that a person cannot be 
arrested for speech expressing criminal advocacy if the 
criminal act itself is preconditioned on the acts of others.136  
Justice Holmes “Great Dissent” in Abrams provided the 
platform for modern First Amendment jurisprudence, and 
forms the basis for the present understanding of free speech 
protections.137 
 
130. Id. 
131. See Healy, supra note 124, at 55-75. 
132. For an interesting discussion on Holmes’ evolution, see Healy, 
supra note 124; David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1303-22 (1983). 
133. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919). 
134. See id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. 
137. See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT - HOW OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND - AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN 
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In his dissent in Abrams, Justice Holmes cited one of his 
own opinions in which he explained the concept of criminal 
attempt, in Swift & Co. v. United States.138  In Swift, Justice 
Holmes clearly laid out what was necessary for criminal 
attempt, proclaiming: “Where acts alone are not sufficient in 
themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent . 
. . but require further acts . . . to bring that result to pass, an 
intent to bring it to pass is necessary to produce a dangerous 
probability that it will happen.”139  Justice Holmes went on to 
say, “[n]ot every act that may be done with intent to produce an 
unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt.”140  
Using the same language that he used in Schenck, Holmes 
reminded that it is still always going to be “. . .a question of 
proximity and degree.”141  It was the “well known” criminal law 
doctrine of attempt as articulated in Swift, that Justice Holmes 
believed should guide the clear and present danger First 
Amendment test.142 
Then, to solidify his place in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, Justice Holmes dissented once again with 
Justice Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York.143  In arguing that the 
prosecution of the petitioner under a state criminal anarchy 
statute for publishing and distributing various socialist 
pamphlets violated the First Amendment, Justice Holmes 
wrote this now famous passage: 
 
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for 
belief and if believed it is acted on unless some 
other belief outweighs it or some failure of 
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only 
difference between the expression of an opinion 
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the 
speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence 
may set fire to reason. But whatever may be 
 
AMERICA (Metropolitan Book 2013). 
138. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
139. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). 
140. Id. at 402. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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thought of the redundant discourse before us it 
had no chance of starting a present 
conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs 
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are 
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of 
the community, the only meaning of free speech 
is that they should be given their chance and 
have their way.144 
 
As explained below, it is Justice Holmes’ articulation of the 
clear and present danger standard in Schenck, constructed on 
the foundation of Swift and elaborated upon in Abrams and 
Gitlow, that should be the standard by which social media 
speech is considered for First Amendment purposes. 
 
 
 
B. Online Speech Should Be Judged by the Clear and Present 
Danger Test 
 
The issues surrounding social media are so complex that 
the relative simplicity of the clear and present danger test, 
grounded in the well-aged principles of criminal attempt, would 
be helpful when deciding whether social media activity is 
constitutionally protected.145 
 
144. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
145. This is not to say clear and present danger test does not have 
critics.  However, many of the test’s critiques have centered on how it has 
been applied (or not applied) by the courts rather than the test itself.  See, 
e.g., David Feister, How Clear Is the Clear and Present Danger Test, 1 GROVE 
CITY C. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 39 (2010).  Other critiques have focused on the fact 
that the clear and present danger test protects too little speech, advocating 
for a near-absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment.  See David R. 
Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and Present Danger Test, 6 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 733 (1998); David R. Dow & R. Scott Schieldes, Rethinking the 
Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L. J. 1217 (1998).  Finally, there is a 
question as to how the clear and present danger test is related to 
Brandenburg and Watts, and whether the imminent lawless action test is a 
refinement of the clear and present danger standard, or a departure.  See 
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: 
In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1175 (1982); 
Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: Dissonance in the 
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970).  However, whether 
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There is a multitude of benefits of applying the clear and 
present danger test as announced in Schenck and clarified in 
Abrams and Gitlow to social media speech.  The clear and 
present danger test has the imminence component that makes 
Brandenburg speech protective, and is especially salient in the 
online context.146  The imminence component is borne in part 
from the idea that if the criminal act is not imminent, a good-
doer has time to intercede, or the speaker has time to change 
her mind.147  This idea is magnified ten-fold in the social media 
context, as it is a medium of communication designed for 
immediate response.  Therefore, if a person truly thought the 
teenager in Chicago was going to shoot up his neighborhood if 
the jury eventually found George Zimmerman not guilty, 
someone would have certainly had the chance to respond and 
intercede, telling him that even if he was serious, that there 
are better ways he can express his frustrations.  Requiring 
there to be imminent danger ensures social media users who 
publish online threats have a chance to recognize their 
foolishness and retract their statement, or be persuaded to 
change their mind prior to risking arrest. 
In a similar vein, the clear and present danger test draws 
from criminal law and looks at the motive of the speaker and 
whether he or she had actual criminal intent, and then 
whether the speaker took some action in furtherance of that 
intent.  And this will often require more than just an online 
posting, which is so easy to do with very little thought, and will 
necessitate some further corroboration of the user’s intent.  
Further, in line with general principles of criminal attempt, 
there will also have to be proof of some action in furtherance of 
the crime discussed via social media to warrant arrest and 
allow conviction.  Before social media thoughtcrime is 
punishable, the government would have to show that the social 
media user actually intended to commit a crime and has the 
ability to do so. 
 
Brandenburg and Watts represent a refinement of the clear and present 
danger test, a departure, or a strange permutation, the tests as explained 
herein are largely unworkable in the online context. 
146. In fact, Justice Holmes actually uses the word imminence in his 
Abrams dissent in place of “present” when describing the standard.  See 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
147. See Gey, supra note 113, at 706. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/13
  
394 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
Another attractive aspect of the clear and present danger 
test is that it takes into account the context of speech and the 
audience receiving it.  People say things online that they would 
never say in person, because for many, social media is a way to 
aggrandize in a setting with limited repercussions.  This 
context is crucial when deciding whether speech constitutes a 
clear and present danger —  when there is just social media 
activity with nothing more, the answer is likely it does not.  
Intimate conversations that were had in the living room in 
front of the television, at the neighborhood bar, or on 
playground are taking place on social media platforms.  
Therefore, treating social media speech in the same manner as 
speech shouted at public rallies or mass-distributed pamphlets 
is in many was nonsensical.  However, criminalizing social 
media activity that creates imminent danger has applicability 
that is more sensible, with the understanding that words alone 
rarely can constitute a significant enough threat to remove the 
speech from the protections of the First Amendment.148 
In situations where an online speaker does intend to 
threaten his audience on a social media network and the threat 
is seemingly imminent, the next step would be to put the threat 
in context, and determine whether the person who is viewing 
the threat would perceive it as such.  In other words, did the 
person with whom the speaker was communicating feel 
immediately threatened by the post.  In that case, similar to 
the common law principles of assault, perhaps the speech can 
be criminalized, because the speech “. . .operates more like a 
physical action than a verbal or symbolic communication of 
ideas or emotions.”149  But there should also be an objective 
analysis as to whether it was reasonable for the person to feel 
threatened given the surrounding context.150 
Some may posit that posting criminal thoughts or threats 
in the public sphere is enough to warrant the exemption of 
 
148. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957) (“Instances of 
speech that could be considered to amount to ‘advocacy of action' are [] few 
and far between.”). 
149. Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and The First Amendment 
Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 593 (2000). 
150. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring) (describing the clear and present danger test as requiring both 
reasonable fear of injury, and that the danger apprehended be imminent). 
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speech from the First Amendment given the harm that can 
result.  This argument is based on the fear that such speech 
engenders and the panic it can cause. 151  While the argument 
is well taken, the threatening, bullying, and violent language 
used regularly online undermines this argument.  If threats 
online, in whatever form, can be criminalized, the slippery 
slope is actually a vertical line.  Moreover, there is a difference 
between making threats with people in close physical 
proximity, and posting threats in an online forum where the 
speaker may be continents away.  Taking the classic example 
used by Justice Holmes, shouting “fire” in a crowded theater is 
unlikely to have the same effect in a popular chatroom.152  And 
in the instances that it does have a similar effect, where social 
media activity does create mass hysteria, in that case perhaps 
abrogation of free speech rights is necessary.153 
Another counterargument this proposed solution is likely 
to face is that it essentially requires law enforcement to wait 
until the crime is near completion, which, as seen in countless 
examples in a Post-9/11 world, could have disastrous 
consequences.  My thesis, however, does not reach government 
monitoring of social media — although there are certainly 
constitutional issues that abound as a result of such programs.  
It also does not prevent law enforcement from using social 
media as a tool for further investigation — there may very well 
be instances where a social media post can give rise to 
reasonable suspicion, allowing limited law enforcement 
interaction, that social media activity can “counsel” further 
investigation.154  My argument is simply stating that it should 
be rare a case where a person’s speech through a social media 
 
151. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 283, 291 (2001). 
152. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting 
fire in a theatre and causing panic.”). 
153. I am sure some would argue that the hypothesis outlined herein is 
not protective enough.  See, e.g., supra note 145.  However, this article rests 
on the assumption that there will not be a tectonic shift in First Amendment 
jurisprudence in the near future, and therefore works with the precedent 
presently on the books. 
154. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1696 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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outlet results in arrest and prosecution.155  And in deciding 
whether social media speech can be criminalized, or whether 
the First Amendment protects it, with protection of speech 
serving as the default, the clear and present danger test can 
serve as a commonsense guide for government officials. 
Although not necessarily one’s first impulse, returning to 
nearly century-old precedent and defining 21st century online 
speech protections in accordance with criminal law is internally 
consistent; harmonizing speech advocating criminal acts with 
common law attempt principles makes sense.  The concept of a 
“clear and present danger” is something that the average 
person can conceptualize and think about as he or she engages 
in online social media activity, and it is something police and 
prosecutors can latch onto when deciding whether further 
action is warranted.  It refocuses the protections of speech with 
an eye as to what is criminal versus what is socially acceptable 
in a way that the average person can understand. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Some may argue that social media thoughtcrime deserves 
no protection as it adds no value to the marketplace, and after 
all, the First Amendment protects speech for its value to 
society.156  Although this First Amendment concept is 
important, it is just as important to remember that the First 
Amendment was also designed to protect an individual’s right 
of expression.157  Moreover, some of the speech exampled above 
does add to the value of the marketplace of ideas and 
democracy in its own way.  Yes, at first blush the examples 
seem to consist solely of silly posts made by reckless young 
people with no larger value.  However, each post has its own 
place within larger social discourse.  For example, while Justin 
 
155. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957). 
156. See Healy, supra note 108, at 700. 
157. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“[The Framers] valued liberty both as an end and as a means.  
They believed liberty to be the secret to happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty.”); Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy 
of Justice Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL 
OF RIGHTS J. 661, 699-700 (2011). 
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Carter may have been joking (allegedly) about shooting up a 
school — in his own way he was highlighting the absurdity and 
the inhumanity of the Sandy Hook shootings.  The Chicago 
teenager reacting to the Zimmerman trial was adding his 
commentary to a salient social-political issue in which almost 
all of America was engaged.  While Sarah the Dutch teenager 
may have been pulling an online prank when tweeting about 
placing a bomb on an American Airlines plane, those who 
tweeted similar sentiments after her were doing so in a 
seeming show of subversive solidarity, protesting her arrest.  
Finally, the British youths that were arrested for using popular 
slang is just further evidence of a transatlantic and cross-
generational communication divide that has always existed. 
While it is easy to write off social media speech as 
valueless, and therefore undeserving of First Amendment 
protections, this entire article is premised on the fact that there 
is value to be had by allowing people to express themselves via 
social media.  That social media expression is often a method of 
engaging in larger social dialogue regardless of how crude the 
expression might be.  And even when social media activity is 
not contributing to a larger social dialogue, social media is an 
important tool of self-expression.  It is a primary means of 
communication for people around the world, supplanting 
speech that was previously conducted in private that people 
would not dream of criminalizing.  Finally, it is critical to 
remember that freedom of speech is the baseline, and as the 
Internet becomes even more deeply entrenched in the human 
experience, the vigorous protection of online speech, including 
social media speech, will be of paramount importance. 
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